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Abstract 
Starting from the assumption that decision situations in economic contexts are char-
acterized by fundamental uncertainty, the paper argues that the decision-making of 
intentionally rational actors is anchored in fictions. “Fictionality” in economic action is 
the inhabitation in the mind of an imagined future state of the world and the beliefs in 
causal mechanisms leading to this future state. Actors are motivated in their actions by 
the imagined future and organize their activities based on these mental representations. 
Since these representations are not confined to empirical reality, fictionality is also a 
source of creativity in the economy. Fictionality opens up a way to an understanding of 
the microfoundations of the dynamics of the economy. The paper develops the notion 
of fictional expectations and applies it to investments, consumption and money. The 
last part relates the notion of fiction to calculation and social macrostructures as two 
other devices of decision-making and hints at the relevance of fictionality for the mac-
rodynamics of capitalism.
Zusammenfassung
Entscheidungshandeln in wirtschaftlichen Kontexten findet unter Bedingungen fun-
damentaler Ungewissheit statt. Ausgehend von dieser Annahme argumentiert das Pa-
pier, dass Entscheidungen intentional rationaler Akteure in Fiktionen verankert sind. 
„Fiktio nalität“ umfasst die Vorstellungen des zukünftigen Zustands der Welt und der 
kausalen Mechanismen, die zu diesem Zustand führen. Akteure werden durch diese 
Imaginationen der Zukunft motiviert und organisieren ihre Handlungen auf ihrer 
Grundlage. Da die Vorstellungen nicht an die empirische Realität gebunden sind, ist 
Fiktionalität auch eine Quelle der Kreativität. Fiktionalität eröffnet so einen Weg zum 
Verständnis der Mikrofundierung wirtschaftlicher Dynamik. Das Papier entwickelt das 
Konzept der fiktionalen Erwartungen und wendet es auf Investitionen, Konsum und 
Geld an. Im letzten Teil wird das Verhältnis von Fiktionen zur Rolle von Kalkulation 
und sozialen Makrostrukturen in der Entscheidungsfindung erörtert und die Relevanz 
von Fiktionalität für die Makrodynamik des Kapitalismus angedeutet.
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Imagined Futures: Fictionality in Economic Action
[There are matters about which] there is no scientific basis on which 
to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not 
know. Nevertheless, the necessity for action and for decision com-
pels us as practical men to do our best to overlook this awkward 
fact … (Keynes 1973[1937]: 213)
On what basis do actors make decisions in economic contexts? According to economic 
theory, decisions are based on rational calculations of the outcomes associated with the 
various possible choices. Following sociological approaches to the economy, decisions 
are anchored in social structures, especially institutions, networks, and cultural frames. 
In this paper, I want to add a different perspective on the question of the micro-foun-
dations of economic action, giving weight to a much underemphasized aspect of it. 
Starting from the assumption that decision situations in economic contexts are charac-
terized by fundamental uncertainty, I argue that the decision-making of intentionally 
rational actors is anchored in fictions. By “fictions” I refer to images of some future state 
of the world or course of events which are cognitively accessible in the present through 
mental representation. “Fictionality” in economic action is the inhabitation in the mind 
of an imagined future state of the world. Actors are motivated in their actions by the 
imagined future state and organize their activities based on these mental representa-
tions. Since these representations are not confined to empirical reality, fictionality is 
also a source of creativity in the economy. Fictional expectations in the economy take 
narrative form as stories, theories, and discourses. Including fictionality in a theory of 
decision-making opens up a way to an understanding of the microfoundations of the 
dynamics of the economy. 
I first provide a brief overview of various approaches in economics and economic so-
ciology to the explanation of economic decision-making. This will sharpen the point 
of departure advanced in the article. Second, I develop the notion of fictional expecta-
tions to be applied here and its role in the constitution of action in economic contexts 
and especially the creativity of action. In the third part, I illustrate the role of fiction 
in the contexts of investments, consumption, and money. In the last section, I relate 
the notion of fiction to the role of calculation and social macrostructures in economic 
decision-making. Finally, in the conclusion I hint at the relevance of fictional expecta-
tions for the macrodevelopment of the economy. 
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1 Decision-making in economics and sociology
Economics
Economic theory assumes that actors make choices based on rational calculations (Wil-
liamson 1993). Assuming a fixed set of preferences, given factor endowments and re-
strictions, actors calculate the choice which maximizes their expected utility. To do so, 
actors systematically scrutinize all possible alternative combinations and calculate the 
consequences of all options. This makes it possible to arrange the various options in 
a rank order of utility and to construct complete indifference maps across all feasible 
trade-offs. The macroeconomic result is an equilibrium which can be deduced math-
ematically based on the starting conditions and the assumptions made in the theory. 
The future enters into the decision models of economics in the form of rational expec-
tations (Muth 1961; Lucas 1972). Assuming market pressures and the systematic use of 
all available information, rational expectations theory states that the predictions actors 
form with regard to economically relevant variables in the future are correct, in the 
aggregate, because all individual errors are random. Hence, the predicted outcomes do 
not differ systematically from the resulting market equilibrium. As a consequence, the 
uncertainty entailed in the future is transformed into a state predictable by forecast, al-
lowing for the rational calculation of optimal choices. “One of the rituals of economic 
theorizing is to assume optimizing behaviour and rational expectations based on a full 
understanding of one’s environment” (Hellwig 1998: 721).
The assumption that decisions in economic contexts can be optimal choices based on 
rational expectations has been criticized within economics. One of the most prominent 
critiques stems from John Maynard Keynes. According to Keynes, expectations “cannot 
be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for 
a calculated mathematical expectation” (Keynes 1964[1936]: 152). In consequence, “all 
sorts of considerations enter into the market valuation which are in no way relevant to the 
prospective yield” (Keynes 1964[1936]: 152). Similarly, economists working in the tradi-
tion of the Austrian School see the limits of rational expectations theory in the unknow-
ability of the future due to novelty that cannot be anticipated in the present (Buchanan/
Vanberg 2008[1984]: 380 f.). Expectations, and the decisions based on them, are shaped by 
the ability of humans “to see and do things in a novel way” (Dequech 1999: 422). 
The possibility of rational calculation has also been questioned by theories of bounded 
rationality.1 Actors lack the necessary information to calculate the optimal choice or 
they might not have the cognitive capabilities to do so (Simon 1957). Moreover, actors 
have different aspirational levels, assume different random events, and cannot predict 
1 A further critique of the economic model refers to its consequences with regard to the determi-
nacy of choices (Parsons 1949[1937]; Bronk 2009: 216). Spiro Latsis (1972) has summarized this 
point in the statement that general equilibrium theory confronts actors with “single-exit” situa-
tions: that is, a situational determinism which reduces choice to the execution of the optimizing 
decision.
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precisely the behavior of their interaction partners (Güth/Kliemt 2010), making it im-
possible to predict equilibrium outcomes. This implies that decision-making cannot be 
understood as the mechanical, rational processing of information, leading to unequivo-
cal equilibria based on optimizing decisions. Economic theories of rational expectation 
are wrong in ignoring the real cognitive capacities of actors: “How can one impute to 
the social agents the capacity to make the calculations that occupy many pages of math-
ematical appendixes in the leading journals and that can be acquired only through years 
of professional training?” (Elster 2009: 7).
Behavioral economics goes beyond the concept of satisficing by attempting to under-
stand systematically the different types of cognitive biases in decision processes.2 It re-
fers to cognitive mechanisms, such as stereotypes, overconfidence, limited attention, the 
sunk-cost fallacy, or projection biases as relevant aspects in decision-making, potential-
ly diverting actors from the optimal choice. The hope of behavioral economists is that, 
once one understands precisely how these cognitive mechanisms influence the decision-
making process, it becomes possible to develop a predictive theory of decision-making 
that is more realistic than expected utility theory. 
Economic sociology
Economic sociology has paid little attention to the micro-foundations of the economy 
(Beckert 2003). This is attributable largely to the structuralist premises of most work 
in economic sociology. In structural theories, the question of how actors make choices 
is answered only indirectly: decisions are anchored in social macrostructures, such as 
networks, institutions, and cultural scripts which direct choices (Callon 1998: 11 ff.; 
Granovetter 1985; Dobbin 2004). Even when explaining the dynamics of economic 
formations, structuralist theories do not necessarily need a behavioral basis. Change 
can be explained also in terms of the internal contradictions of institutional configura-
tions (DiMaggio 1988; Streeck/Thelen 2005), the reconfiguration of network structures 
(Burt 1992), or exogenous cultural shifts. To the extent that theories in economic sociol-
ogy address the issue of micro-foundations, they usually make pragmatic use of ratio-
nal actor models, assuming, for instance, that behavior changes with different institu-
tional incentives (Hall/Soskice 2001) or a change in position in the network structure 
(Burt 1992; Granovetter 1985). Structuralist theories in economic sociology are closely 
related to economics if they consider networks and technologies to be the basis for the 
possibility of rational calculation (Callon 1998; Callon/Muniesa 2005). 
2 An important vantage point for behavioral economics has been the work of Maurice Allais 
(1953), who showed that, in certain betting experiments, agents violate the principle of maxi-
mum expected utility.
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Although structuralist approaches dominate in economic sociology, this is not to say 
that there have been no advances which deal with questions of the micro-foundations 
of economic action (Barbalet 2010; Beckert 2003; Storper/Salais 1997). These theories 
usually make the uncertainty and indeterminacy of decision situations the starting 
point of their reasoning and bring to the fore the need for actors to interpret the so-
cial macrostructures in the action process. According to Neil Fligstein (2001: 112) the 
identities of actors – that is, their interpretation of the structures of the world – are not 
fixed but emerge in the process of social interaction. Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin 
(1997: 15) argue that actors define “themselves strategically in the very act of constitut-
ing their context” because context is not objectively given but established through the 
definition of the situation carried out by the actors who are acting in these structures. 
The economics of conventions (Favereau/Lazega 2002) assumes the simultaneous pres-
ence of different conventions, making it necessary for actors to decide which conven-
tion holds in a specific situation, a process that takes place in the action process and is 
potentially conflictual. 
2 From rational expectations to fictional expectations
Action takes place in the present but is directed towards the future. Making a choice 
means to evaluate possible courses of action in light of a future desired state.3 To make 
decisions in the economy, actors must form expectations, among other things, with 
regard to technological development, consumer preferences, prices, availability of raw 
materials, the strategies of competitors, the demand for labor, the trustworthiness of 
promises, the state of the natural environment, political regulations, and the interde-
pendencies between these factors. 
The complexity of decision situations, cognitive biases, unforeseeable interaction ef-
fects, and genuine novelty through unpredictable innovations and the choices of other 
actors make it impossible to predict the future as already implied in the present. The 
future holds “novelty and genuinely unpredictable outcomes” (Buchanan/Vanberg 
2008[1984]: 380). Hence “choices represent a gamble in an unanalyzable world. It is a 
gamble on being intelligent in the long run” (Augier/Kreiner 2000: 677).4 
3 In this article, I assume that actors in economic contexts are intentionally rational: they intend 
to maximize their utility. This is not to deny the crucial role of routine behavior also in eco-
nomic contexts (Camic 1986; Tappenbeck 1999: 48). The discussion here, however, refers only 
to a type of action in which actors are reflexive in the sense that they make decisions based on 
a deliberate consideration of alternatives, weighted against each other with regard to their ex-
pected outcomes.
4 In part, this is a problem of lack of thoroughness of economic analysis (Hellwig 1998: 719 ff.). 
However, the problem cannot be reduced to superficiality of analysis. In practical terms, actors 
are simply overburdened and therefore cannot take all relevant information into account (Elster 
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However, despite its unknowability, actors form expectations with regard to the future 
state of the world, the relevant parameters for their decisions, and the likely decisions 
of relevant other actors. On what basis are expectations formed if they are not rational 
calculations of what will indeed be the case? What are expectations under conditions 
of uncertainty?
I suggest that expectations with regard to uncertain future events are “fictions.” These 
“fictions” provide parameters for decision-making and thereby provide orientation de-
spite the uncertainty inherent in the situation. At the same time, such fictions are them-
selves also a source of the uncertainty they are responding to because decisions based on 
counterfactual imaginings can bring about novelty. Table 1 juxtaposes different modes 
of decision-making.
Fictionality
The term “fiction” is alien to economic discourse. It stems from literary theory. Fiction 
as a term derives from the Latin “fictio,” which means “forming,” which is itself derived 
from the term “fingere” (to shape, to form, to make up) (Bunia 2009: 47; Vaihinger 
2007[1911]: 129). The main characteristic of fiction is not that it is not real – hence the 
mistaken opposition between fiction and reality – but that it creates a world of its own. 
Fiction “creates a space, in which one can in thought and imagination experience a dif-
ferent reality which can differ from real reality to any extent” (Bunia 2009: 47). 
In this sense, John Searle (1975: 320) has characterized fiction as “non-serious.” By this 
Searle does not mean that writing fiction is not a serious activity but that the author 
of fiction “isn’t seriously committed” to believing that the statements he makes are in-
deed true propositions about the world. The worlds created through fiction are based 
not on an empirically observable truth but on the author’s imaginings. This does not 
imply that there is no correspondence to reality. On the contrary, the assertions made 
in fictional texts achieve their credibility often because they could very well be true or 
because they are closely interwoven with elements that are indeed nonfictional.5 
2009). And with regard to novelty the necessary information for optimizing decisions is simply 
not available at the time of decision making (Dequech 2003). 
5 Another element of the credibility of fictional texts is their coherence (Searle 1975: 331).
Table 1 Rational and fictional expectations
Mode of operation Situation Basis for decisions
Calculation Certainty and risk Rational expectations
Script following Uncertainty (certainty and risk) Social macrostructures
Imagination Uncertainty Fictional expectations
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The parallel with representations of the future finding expression in the expectations of 
economic actors is evident. Such depictions can also be “non-serious” only in the sense 
that they refer to non-observable states that may or may not take place. 
This brings up the question of why neither fictional texts nor expectations regard-
ing future events are simply disregarded as uninteresting or even as lies. Why is the 
reader or the holder of expectations willing to assume an attitude described by the 
British Romantic poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge as “the willing suspension of disbelief” 
(Coleridge 1817)? 
Searle shows that the willingness to suspend disbelief is based on specific rules applied 
in the writing and reception of fictional texts but not in the writing and reception of 
non-fictional texts. What makes fiction possible “is a set of extralinguistic, nonseman-
tic conventions … [that] enable the speaker to use words with their literal meanings 
without undertaking the commitments that are normally required by those meanings” 
(Searle 1975: 326). The author of fiction is “pretending” to make an assertion “or acting 
as if she were making an assertion” (ibid.: 324). Pretending here does not mean that the 
author intends to deceive the reader, but rather that she pretends in the sense of act-
ing “as if.” The conventions are shared by readers who are willing to go along with the 
pretended assertions made by the author. Searle summarizes his analysis of the charac-
teristics of fiction in the definition: “A fictional story is a pretended representation of a 
state of affairs” (ibid.: 328). 
The analysis of the characteristics of fictional texts is relevant beyond literary theory be-
cause of “the crucial role, usually underestimated, that imagination plays in human life, 
and the equally crucial role that shared products of imagination play in human social 
life” (Searle 1975: 332). Hence the fictional is not confined to the literary world: “Fic-
tions also play vital roles in the activities of cognition and behavior, as in the founding 
of institutions, societies, and world pictures” (Iser 1993: 12). 
It is this intuition which is taken up here. I suggest that, under conditions of uncertainty 
in which future states of the world cannot be calculated, fictions, created by the actors 
in the field, substitute for the unachievable calculation-based anticipation of future 
states and of future events.6 Fictional expectations allow actors to create a representa-
tion of future events, making them capable of acting purposefully with reference to this 
pretended future, even though this future is indeed unknown and therefore unpredict-
able. Fictionality, moreover, allows the attribution of qualities to goods that exist only 
as imaginaries. By analogy to the definition of fictional texts provided by John Searle 
6 Although imaginings form the basis for fiction – its production and its reception – and the 
notion of imagination plays a greater role in economic thought (Bronk 2009; Shackle 1979) 
than the concept of fictionality, fiction seems to be the more suitable conception. As Volkmann 
(2001: 15) elaborates with reference to Wolfgang Iser, the act of fictionalizing converts the dif-
fuseness of the imaginary into a gestalt. Fictionalizing “provides the imaginary with a determi-
nacy that it would otherwise not possess” (ibid.).
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I argue that expectations are, under conditions of uncertainty, “pretended representa-
tions of a state of affairs.”
The argument relates to Hans Vaihinger’s (2007[1911]) epistemological analysis of the 
role of fiction in science. Vaihinger describes scientific categories and theories as “con-
sciously false assumptions” (ibid.: XII) in the sense that the objects characterized do 
not actually possess the characteristics ascribed to them but are treated as if they would 
hold these characteristics (ibid.: 163). The use of such fictions is necessary since hu-
mans can never know the underlying reality of the world itself.7 A similar problematic 
holds for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Since the future cannot be 
known, expectations are images of future states of the world which are taken by actors 
as if they were true. They are “placeholders” (Riles 2010) in the decision-making process 
through which the unknowability of future states of the world and courses of events is 
overlooked for the moment. 
Fictions as stories 
The use of the notions “imagination” and “fictionality” warrants further clarification. In 
a way, all action is based on imaginings of future states. Alfred Schütz (2004: 152 ff.) de-
fines action as behavior that has been designed in advance. The actor, in order to choose 
a course of action, must put himself imaginatively in the situation in which the goal is 
already achieved. While this holds true for all action, it is not a necessary condition for 
action that the actor can rationally calculate how the future will look. Under conditions 
of uncertainty this is exactly what he cannot do. Instead of leading to paralysis, uncer-
tainty is “overcome” by suspending the disbelief in the calculability of future states, and 
by acting based on fictional depictions which are handled by the actors as if they were 
true representations of the future.
These fictional depictions take narrative form. It is through their story-structure that 
imaginings of future states become determinate (Iser 1993). Stories have become a topic 
in economic sociology (Diaz-Bone/Krell 2009; Mützel 2010; White 1992), organization 
studies (Brown et al. 2005; Czarniawska 2004), economic anthropology (Holmes 2009), 
and political science (Salmon 2007), but also in economics (Akerlof/Shiller 2009; Mc-
Closkey 1990). One strand of this research focuses on narrative representations of past 
occurrences that take the form of organizational, economic, or societal myths (Ander-
son 1983). Stories, however, are also used to depict future events imaginatively. 
7 Vaihinger’s argument is closely related to John Dewey’s (1988[1929]) analysis of the knowledge 
process. According to Dewey, scientific progress develops in the action process based on “beliefs” 
which provide orientation. Beliefs are tentative knowledge that must be verified in practical 
activity. The underlying uncertainty cannot be dissolved but is the basis for continuous inquiry 
into the characteristics of the objective world. 
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Financial markets are especially prone to giving rise to such stories about events in the 
future, as can be seen from the dotcom euphoria, the enthusiasm for the biotechnology 
industry in the late 1990s, or the BRIC concept a few years later. Moreover, influential 
economic actors such as central banks shape expectations through narratives giving an 
account of the current economic situation and its future development. Such narratives 
serve as “analytical bridges to the near future” (Holmes 2009: 386). Instead of just re-
porting the facts, stories create “the economy itself as a communicative field and as an 
empirical fact” (ibid.: 384). 
The stories circulating move markets by influencing demand and prices: “Stories im-
part meaning, which is to say worth” (McCloskey 1990: 68). The expectation that gold 
will rise to two thousand dollars, put forward by commodities investor Jim Rogers in 
October 2010 (see the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of October 20, 2010), is a story 
providing a justification for investing money in the precious metal. Rogers can foresee 
future events in the commodity markets as little as anybody else, but his story may 
nevertheless shape expectations and thereby motivate investment decisions. “High con-
fidence tends to be associated with inspirational stories, stories about new business ini-
tiatives, tales of how others are getting rich” (Akerlof/Shiller 2009: 55).
Fictional depictions, however, not only create worth, but can also destroy it: the “Asian 
crisis” in 1997 started out as a “Thai crisis.” Investors took the crisis in Thailand as evi-
dence of potential difficulties in other Asian countries (Hellwig 1998: 715). This opin-
ion formed in the financial markets despite very different situations in these countries 
in terms of economic fundamentals. By withdrawing funds also from countries like 
Korea investors created the difficulties that were predicted by the story. 
If a sufficient number of investors believe in the fictional depiction it becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy. If the fictional story is disappointed, expectations will eventually 
be revised. This points to an experimental process in which stories are open to “revi-
sion and modification as new data and new interpretative insights become available” 
(Holmes 2009: 401). Stories, however, can also prevail despite known flaws and incoher-
encies due to organizational inertia, group pressures, and powerful particular interests. 
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Language and reasoning are not necessarily employed for the benefit of the institution for which 
one works; most importantly they serve the purposes of the speaker within the institution. For 
these purposes, it is important that one uses formulations that are effective – without necessar-
ily being right. (Hellwig 1998: 721)
Fictions and economic dynamics
By not being bound to rational calculation, action has a much higher degree of freedom 
than assumed by rational actor theory (Schütz 2003: 148 f.). The images themselves are 
not determined by the situation and are therefore not predictable (Tappenbeck 1999: 
89).8 The images of the future may be untamed speculations or, at the other extreme, 
pretend to be a determinate representation of a future state.9 
Due to their unlimited freedom, non-literary fictions are of particular importance for 
understanding innovative processes and hence the dynamics of the economy. Imagina-
tion makes possible “conceptual jumps which allow us to generate new hypotheses and 
see things differently” (Bronk 2009: 203). They allow actors to move beyond inherited 
thought-patterns and categories by bringing them into an as-if world in which given re-
ality is surpassed and a different one considered (Bronk 2009: 201; Tappenbeck 1999: 53). 
The creative re-thinking of the parameters of a decision situation based on imaginaries 
makes it possible to reorganize links in a “new narrative texture” (Patalano 2003: 4). 
In this sense, the fictional can be “subversive of established order” (Bronk 2009). The 
indeterminacy of fictional expectations is also an indispensable basis for what David 
Stark (2009) has called the “sense of dissonance.” Different fictional expectations can be 
operational at the same time. Entrepreneurship exploits the opportunities opened up 
by this indeterminacy in the interpretation of the situation.
The connection between imagination and innovativeness has been supported in par-
ticular by the work of economists working in the Keynesian and Austrian traditions and 
in the Carnegie School. George Shackle (1979) sees the uncertain basis of expectations 
as allowing for the freedom to create hitherto unexplored visions of the future. Choice 
8 Psychological theories (Beach/Mitchell 1987) distinguish between several mental images 
through which knowledge is represented. The self-image, consisting of personal beliefs and val-
ues; the trajectory-image depicting a desirable future; the action-image, portraying the sequenc-
es of actions needed to achieve the desirable future; and the projected-image which depicts the 
anticipated results of the action.
9 An example of the latter type of fiction is forecasts of economic growth provided by economic 
research institutes. Based on the theoretical considerations developed here it would be a cat-
egorical mistake to blame such forecasts with hindsight for being wrong. They are necessarily 
wrong because the future cannot be foreseen. They may nevertheless serve an important func-
tion in the action process by providing reasons for decisions. Actors act as if the forecasts were 
right. Ironically, they can become true precisely because actors act as if they were true. In this 
sense, fictions can be self-fulfilling prophecies. 
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is choice “amongst imagined experiences” (Shackle 1964: 12). James Buchanan and Vik-
tor Vanberg (2008[1984]) argue that, given that the future state of the world depends 
on choices yet to be made, any knowledge of this future “can be a matter of speculation, 
but not of foreknowledge” (ibid.: 385). In a market economy, this lack of foreknowledge 
is at the same time a source of innovativeness. Markets institutionalize the “creative-
inventive-imaginative element in choice” (ibid.: 389). From an organizational perspec-
tive, James March sees fictionality as a non-rational decision device contributing to 
actors’ willingness to engage in innovations: “Soothsayers create sheltered worlds of 
ignorance, ideology and faith. Within the shell that they provide, craziness is protected 
long enough to elaborate its challenge to orthodoxy (March 1995: 437).10 
Fictions as a basis for action
Although non-literary fictions are “non-serious” in the sense that they pretend facts, 
they can be sources of action and thereby constitutive of reality. By motivating action, 
the fiction-ability of humans (Wolfgang Iser) is not simply an illusion. 
That “imagined experiences” (Shackle 1964: 12) of future states can in fact motivate 
decisions seems to be connected to the emotions these images evoke. George Shackle 
has argued that the imagined outcomes of choices evoke emotions of an “enjoyment 
by anticipation” (Shackle 1979: 45) that are instant rewards for the personal commit-
ment to a particular action. “Imagination can perceive an attainable state of thought 
and realize it as an attained satisfaction” (ibid.: 47). It is these pleasurable sensations 
experienced by actors exposing themselves to (uncertain) endeavors which help ex-
plain their willingness to commit themselves and to overcome environmental pressures 
towards conformity. “The attachment to a fantasy converts the ambiguities of history 
into confirmations of belief and a willingness to persist in a course of action” (March 
1995: 437).11 In psychological terms, “high-risk behavior, like play and exploration in 
organizations that insist on rationality, may heighten the intensity of feelings, and may 
motivate a commitment to, for example, projects that are at the same time imagined 
with a substantial amount of disbelief” (Augier/Kreiner 2000: 678).
10 For the relationship between imaginaries and social order and change, see especially the work of 
Cornelius Castoriadis (1998).
11 This is a process not limited to imaginings in the economy. With regard to religious beliefs, Pas-
cal asserted that the “hope which Christians have of possessing an infinite good is mingled with 
real enjoyment, … they hope for holiness, for freedom from injustice, and they have something 
of this” (Pascal 1958[1672]: 145). Albert Hirschman (1986: 150) applied this thought to politi-
cal activities: the members of a group fighting for a revolutionary goal experience a sensation of 
the utopian state while they are engaged in the struggle, although they indeed live in the present 
under the most oppressive conditions. To experience this sensation, the actor must have com-
mitted himself to the struggle for the goal.
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Literary and non-literary fictions
The analogy between literary and non-literary fictions warrants two qualifications, 
pointing to differences between the two. Firstly, while literary texts wear their fictional-
ity on their sleeve, non-literary fictions hide it. 
In the self-disclosure of its fictionality, an important feature of the fictional text comes to the 
fore: it turns the whole of the world organized in the text into an “as-if” construction. In light 
of this qualification (implicitly accepted the moment we embark on our reading), it is clear 
that we must and do suspend all natural attitudes adopted toward the “real” world once we are 
confronted with the represented world … Just as the incorporated “real” world is bracketed off, 
so too are our natural attitudes. (Iser 1993: 12–13)
By contrast, in the non-literary narrative of future states of the world, the “natural at-
titude” remains in place. Although actors (should) know that the imaginaries of the 
future are, as such, “non-serious,” they act as if they were serious – in other words, fac-
tual. This is a crucial condition for fictions to motivate action, because only if they are 
perceived as factual anticipations of future states will economic actors base their choices 
on them.12 
The second difference is that fictions in economic contexts actually do motivate actions 
in the real world, while literary fiction does not (at least, it is not intended to do so13). In 
the terminology of Alfred Schütz (2003: 148), this reflects the difference between “mere 
fantasies,” with regard to which there is no intention of realization, and “design fanta-
sies” (Entwurfsphantasien), in respect of which there are plans to put them into practice. 
This also indicates a difference in the status of non-seriousness and seriousness between 
non-literary fictions and literary fictions. 
Because the non-literary fiction that motivates economic action is based on the assump-
tion that what is currently an imaginary will be turned into something existent at a later 
point in time, fiction in economic contexts is vulnerable to contradictory experiences in 
the real world and at least potentially open to adaptation. “The rationality badge of the 
As If is by definition only for the present, subject to further reevaluation” (Riles 2010: 9). 
John Dewey (1957) analyzed this process in terms of the notion of “ends-in-view.” Such 
ends-in-view are plans for action which structure current decisions but change in the 
course of action based on new experiences. This connection between cognition and 
experience leads to a concept of situated rationality in which goals are revised continu-
12 For their effectiveness it does not matter whether actors themselves believe in the fictions or 
they only believe that others believe in them and therefore base their actions on them.
13 This does not exclude the fact that fiction has educational purposes: one might mention here 
the Bildungsroman. It also does not exclude the fact that readers take the characters of novels as 
heroes whose actions they sometimes imitate, as was the case, for instance, after the publication 
of Goethe’s Werther and Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye: both books led to suicides among their 
readers. 
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ously. Contrary to the assumptions of teleological theories of action, goals and prefer-
ences are not conceptualized as external to the action situation but rather discovered in 
the situation itself. Ends-in-view are “foreseen consequences which influence present 
deliberation” (Dewey 1957: 223). Fictional depictions are only preliminary and change 
in the situation (Barbalet 2010: 6; Joas 1996; Putnam 2006: 282; Whitford 2002: 339). 
While with regard to economic fictions real world experiences have feedback effects, a 
novel will not be rewritten because it turns out that it does not stand the test of reality. 
Text and reality are dissociated. 
3 Fictionality in economic action
How do fictions enter into economic decision-making? All economic decision-making 
is oriented towards the future. In this section I illustrate the relevance of fictional expec-
tations by discussing investment decisions, consumption, and money as central realms 
of decision-making in the economy. 
Investment decisions
Innovation 
Capitalist economies are characterized by their dynamic character, stemming from 
constant innovation. To a large degree, competition in capitalist economies takes place 
through the introduction of new products, new manufacturing processes, or product 
differentiation.
The central role of fictional expectations for innovations was already recognized by 
Joseph Schumpeter (1912). Schumpeter’s analysis sets out from the observation that 
new combinations exist at the beginning only in the consciousness of the actor. While 
most actors are caught in routines, some actors “with more acute intelligence and a 
more active imagination envisage countless new combinations” (ibid.: 163). As soon as 
the entrepreneur considers possible new combinations, he will “adapt his economic ac-
tivities accordingly” (ibid.: 165). This has direct consequences for the economy because 
the entrepreneur will, based on the imaginary of the possible new combination, change 
the value assessment of the goods offered in the market – in other words, change prod-
uct demand. This leads to changes in relative prices. Using the terminology introduced 
above, the entrepreneur “pretends” the existence of the imagined new combinations in 
the future and structures his present behavior on the basis of these pretensions. 
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Schumpeter insists that entrepreneurial innovation in the economy is incompatible 
with the calculative behavior assumed by economic theory. Innovations cannot be ra-
tionally deduced from existing knowledge. Instead, the imaginaries of economic actors 
motivate and guide inherently incalculable innovative activity. This point is also sup-
ported by James Buchanan and Victor Vanberg (2008[1984]) who emphasize that the 
choices of entrepreneurs are not between possibilities which are already “out there,” but 
“that the reality of the future must be made by choices yet to be made, and this reality 
has no existence independent of these choices” (ibid.: 386). Innovation “requires the 
imaginative injection of inherently unpredictable novelty” (Bronk 2009: 209).
The role of fictions in technological innovation has come to the fore in many studies. 
According to Harro van Lente and Arie Rip (1998: 222) innovation processes start with 
the “voicing of promises” which show the way to collective projections of the future. 
This leads in a second step to agenda setting. The voicing of promises has not only the 
function of shaping a collective mind-set but also of protecting new ideas from disbelief 
so they can be cultivated. Hence it is a utopian vision which stands at the outset, which 
shows a pretended future reality that comes into existence (or doesn’t) as a result of the 
fiction standing at the outset. Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas (2004: 7) argue that 
technological vision is “not simply a means to characterize new technology, rather it 
serves both to define new technologies and to construct them.” According to David Nye 
(2004) technological predictions are narratives about our desires for the future, rather 
than accurate reflections of technological capabilities. 
Investment 
Investments are costly commitments to anticipated future states of the world, associ-
ated with the uncertainty of whether this state will indeed prevail. Based on the expec-
tation that a certain situation will duly transpire, investors commit money (or time) 
to a specific venture – either engaging in the production of a product or investing in a 
financial asset – expecting a gain in utility from it. Although investors undoubtedly take 
great pains in trying to calculate which investments will maximize their gains (given 
their respective tolerance for risk) many economists have been critical of the possibility 
of doing so. Frank Knight (1985[1921]) saw the very possibility of profit as depending 
on the incalculability of outcomes of investments. John Maynard Keynes (1964[1936]) 
argued that under conditions of genuine uncertainty, investments are based on conven-
tions, fluctuate with rapid waves of optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, and reflect a 
“spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction” (ibid.: 161).
Despite the incalculability of the outcome of investments actors must form expecta-
tions with regard to pay-offs. What is the basis of expectations of investors? Calcula-
tion plays an important role. But rather than leading to the recognition of the optimal 
choice in an objective sense, calculations should – under conditions of uncertainty – be 
considered to be fictions themselves (Dobbin 2001); because they appear rational they 
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 / 8
provide legitimated justifications for decisions despite the incalculability of outcomes. 
Hence, calculations in situations characterized by fundamental uncertainty have an en-
tirely different role than the one assumed by the actors themselves: they are not instru-
ments which allow us to anticipate the future, but tranquilizers against the paralyzing 
effects of having to act in unpredictable environments. 
One field in which this can be observed especially well is financial investment. The 
unpredictability of financial markets has its chief cause in their self-referentiality (Or-
léan 2005; Soros 1998; Shiller 2000). This means that the calculative efforts of financial 
investors must anticipate the expectations of other investors in the market with regard 
to the development of market opinion (Keynes 1964[1936]). 
The decisions of market actors regarding market opinion can follow convention (Or-
léan 2008; Keynes 1973[1937]: 114), but can also mirror peer pressure ensuing from 
the style of discourse (Hellwig 2009: 161) or reflect imaginaries. Kraemer (2010) has 
argued that a shared belief in certain market developments can either be an expression 
of isomorphism or be produced by charismatic financial entrepreneurs who succeed in 
influencing the beliefs of other market participants with their stories. Market influenc-
ing beliefs stem from powerful investors, bank analysts, economists, or central banks 
and high-ranking treasury officials. 
Based on research by Douglas Holmes (2009), Stephen Nelson and Peter Katzenstein 
(2010) argue that central banks manage the expectations of investors by “talking to the 
markets” through public statements and carefully worded interviews:
Prices become anchored in the expectations of market participants who take these allegories 
seriously and adjust their practices and expectations … Together with open market operations, 
the economic narratives of central banks thus become the second main determinant for price 
developments. Put differently, uncertainty is being reduced by discursive practices that rely on 
strategic rhetorical action with essentially pedagogical aims. (Nelson/Katzenstein 2010: 31 f.)
Expectations of financial investors might be connected to charismatic ideas which 
“point beyond exclusively economic profit calculation” (Kraemer 2010: 14). Invest-
ment strategies are loaded, for instance, with a “growth story” which entails elements 
of prophecy. Such charismatic fictions provide motivation for investment decisions de-
spite the incalculability of future yields. 
The proliferation of such fictions – that is, their influence on investors – often depends 
on their connections to normative ideas of a “better society.” Examples of this include 
influential fictions, such as investments in renewable energies or investments in the 
housing market which are anchored in a cultural discourse of hopes for a better society 
(Sturken/Thomas 2004). 
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In a similar vein, Hirokazu Miyazaki (2003) has argued in a study on arbitrage trading 
on the Tokyo stock exchange that this trading strategy is based on an underlying “faith” 
on the part of the traders in the efficient market hypothesis. Arbitrage trading seeks to 
identify financial assets which are “mispriced relative to their theoretical value” (ibid.: 
258). Rather than “being true,” traders act as if the efficient market hypothesis were true. 
The theory is akin to utopian thought, emphasizing a gap between reality and the ideal. 
“Economic myths” (Deutschmann 2009) contributing to the shared assumptions of in-
vestors with regard to the future yield of an investment can become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, causing the success of the investment anticipated in the fictional depiction. 
This holds true if the shared expectations create widespread demand for the asset, lead-
ing to higher prices, stronger sales and profits that were anticipated at the beginning of 
the process as a pretension. In this case, the fictionality of economic decision-making 
is performative. Actors might interpret the outcome as confirmation of the accuracy of 
their “calculation,” although the outcome is the result of the joint belief in a fictional 
expectation.14 
Strategy
Closely related to investments is the formation of business strategies. Strategies are heu-
ristics in decision situations through which firms define their identity in the market. 
They give a general direction in decision-making by proclaiming general goals, prod-
ucts on which the firm focuses, technologies seen as promising, or market develop-
ments identified as relevant. All these guideposts for decision-making are produced 
under conditions of the unknowability of the future; in other words, conditions of 
uncertainty. Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (1997: 15) have argued that strategic 
business choices cannot be understood as optimization because the contexts of action 
are not objectively given but constituted by the actors’ interpretation of the situation. 
Actors’ choices “depend on their articulation of stories about possible developments” 
(ibid.). The formation of strategies is based on pretended facts, articulated as fictional 
expectations of the future. 
One realm in which the role of fictionality in strategy development comes to the fore 
is the constitution of new markets. Sophie Mützel (2010) has investigated the process 
of strategy formation at biotechnology firms aiming to develop genetically engineered 
medication for treating breast cancer. This is a highly uncertain environment in which 
the success of firms’ research strategies cannot be foreseen and hopes of successful prod-
14 The influence of fictional depictions of future states on investments is not limited to financial 
markets; it is a much wider phenomenon. It shows itself, for instance, in the bequest of wealth 
(Beckert 2008), the buying of life insurance (Zelizer 1979: 595 f.), the purchase of lottery tickets, 
or investments in education motivated by imaginaries of intergenerational upward mobility, 
supported by collective narratives such as the “American dream.”
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uct development are often disappointed. Actors’ expectations take the form of narra-
tives, which are communicated in the market field. Such narratives consist of stories of 
how the goal of development of a certain medical therapy can be pursued successfully. 
The fictional depictions have several functions. They are signals to competitors, inform-
ing them of the convictions of other players with regard to promising strategies. More-
over, the stories establish reciprocal perspectives on the position of each firm within the 
market field and “thereby have stabilizing effects within the network structure” (Mützel 
2010: 93). The narratives have the further consequence of generating expectations in the 
financial community. They serve as a basis for investment decisions. The narratives can 
thus contribute to raising share prices by influencing investors’ expectations positively, 
or – in case of disappointing stories regarding the outlook for a firm’s strategy – to their 
decline. The empirical case investigated by Mützel (2010) provides insights into the 
role of fictionality in the constitution of market structures. It also shows how fictional 
expectations come to be revised based on their “testing” in reality. 
A second example of the role of fictionality in strategy construction is provided by 
Guido Möllering’s (2010) investigation of decision-making processes in technology 
development in the semiconductor industry. Möllering’s focus is an industry work-
shop called the Next Generation Lithography Workshop, where competing firms from 
the semiconductor industry come together to debate their expectations with regard 
to industry development and their intended strategies for creating new technologies. 
Again, this is a field characterized by high uncertainty with regard to technological 
development and only tentative prospects. The industry workshop aims at providing 
orientation for firms by identifying the most important issues to be resolved, informa-
tion about opinions on the most promising technologies, and an understanding of the 
timeframes involved before certain steps in technological development are likely to be 
completed. What is presented at the workshop are fictional representations of future 
states which show the convictions of participants, shape the expectations of industry 
actors, and provide rationales for the decisions to be taken in the present. The narra-
tives contribute to the constitution of the market by shaping the technological strate-
gies pursued. 
A last example of the role of fictional depictions in strategy development refers to the 
outsourcing of production. Geny Piotti (2009) has investigated the decision-making 
processes of German firms outsourcing parts of their production to China in the mid-
2000s. She shows that these decisions were often ill-informed and in many cases led to 
disappointment of the hopes associated with the strategic move. What motivated firms 
to go to China? Piotti shows from the interviews conducted with managers involved 
in these decisions that the choice was not so much rooted in economic calculation as 
motivated by a general euphoria with regard to investment in China created by the 
media and industry organizations, such as chambers of commerce. The depictions of 
the opportunities presented through narratives by firms already operating in China 
triggered overly optimistic assessments, motivating decisions which often led to losses. 
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Some managers interviewed by Piotti compared the decision to outsource to China ex-
plicitly “to the Gold Rush in America” (Piotti 2009: 23). Narratives of the great oppor-
tunities opening up in China, strong normative pressures in the field, and sentiments of 
euphoria were major ingredients in the decision to relocate. The reference to the Gold 
Rush reveals again the role overarching “economic myths” may play in decision-making 
in conditions of uncertainty. 
Consumption
While the realms of fictional expectations discussed so far all refer to investment deci-
sions, fictional depictions of a future state also play an important role when it comes 
to explaining the desire to purchase goods. In his Philosophy of Money Georg Simmel 
(2004[1978]) analyzed value as emerging from a distance between a desired object and 
its mental accessibility. The desired products are already present as images to the con-
sumer before they are purchased and it is the emotions created by the idea of possessing 
them that motivate purchasing decisions (Campbell 1987; McCracken 1988). Satisfac-
tion is experienced in anticipation of the possession of the good. This confirms the 
observation developed in the previous section that imaginaries can bring about a state 
of mind in which the situation, which so far exists only as a mental representation, is 
already felt as real.
The desirability of goods depends on imaginaries of how they will satisfy a need. In con-
temporary economies the utility of goods often consists of symbolic meanings. Certain 
goods become representations of the identities of social groups or more generally of 
social status and hence position their owners within a differentiated social world. It is 
this power of goods which becomes a source of their desirability (Bourdieu 1984; Ve-
blen 1973[1899]; Simmel 2004[1978]). Other goods assume symbolic value by becom-
ing representations of espoused values and aspired-to ideals which are intangible. The 
values become symbolically embodied in specific goods and thereby accessible (Beckert 
2011). Objects may evoke fantasies based on symbolic associations with desired events, 
people, places or values and thereby create the desire for the product (McCracken 1988: 
104 ff.; Campbell 1987). Here the good performs as an arbitrator or bridge between the 
subject and a desired but intangible ideal. 
An example of this is the role of provenance in antique markets. The value of an item 
of antique furniture depends not only on its physical properties but also on its former 
possessors (“a chair owned by Napoleon”) and stories of past uses of the object (“the 
chair on which Napoleon sat when he …”). Value in the market for antiques is created 
by either finding out about such associations of objects with prominent people or his-
torically significant situations or simply by making such stories up (Bogdanova 2010). 
The narrative is a piece of fiction which constitutes imaginaries, connecting the object 
with adored former owners or important historical situations and allowing the owner 
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of the piece to achieve “closeness” to them. In both cases the value of goods is anchored 
in their symbolic meaning, which is fictional in the sense that the asserted connection 
between the materiality of the good and its symbolic meaning is based on the suspen-
sion of disbelief that the good is more than what is embodied in its materiality.
Georg Simmel observes the paradoxical fact that the attraction of goods is stronger in 
anticipation than when the distance from the imagined qualities is overcome through 
the act of purchase. “The moment of enjoyment itself, when the separation of subject 
and object is effaced, consumes the value” (Simmel 2004[1978]: 66). While the desire to 
“realize” imaginaries may motivate the purchase of symbolically charged consumption 
goods, its actual realization destroys the fiction and with it the desire.
The fictional character of the value of consumer goods and the risk that this value will 
vanish through the very act of appropriation is a crucial ingredient in the explanation 
of the dynamics of consumption. Goods become symbolic representations of “pretend-
ed” future states that motivate purchasers to buy them. The faltering of the imaginary 
as a consequence of the appropriation or because of a shift in symbolic meaning is com-
pensated by the projection of desires on new objects: a process that can be reproduced 
endlessly, as long as consumers project symbolic qualities onto objects, and provides a 
basis for explaining the dynamics of capitalism from the demand side. 
Trust and money
Trust differs systematically from the other realms discussed because it does not refer 
to the purchase of objects or property rights but to social relationships. The centrality 
of trust in the economy has recently come to the fore in the financial crisis. In 2008, 
the interbank lending market collapsed because private banks no longer trusted the 
counterparty to repay the loan. Liquidity could be kept in the market only through the 
infusion of money by central banks. Hence, trust was shifted from the economic system 
to the political system. 
Generating trust can be seen as a major problem confronting modern economies and as 
a principal objective of the regulatory activities of the state. Trust is the precondition for 
actors to engage in cooperative relations where they expose themselves to the risk that 
the contracts they make may not be fulfilled by the counter-party (Arrow 1974; Gam-
betta 1988; Luhmann 1979; Möllering 2006; Kreps 1990). Trust is also the foundation 
of the modern money economy in which the value of money is not guaranteed through 
a fixed exchange rate with a valuable commodity but hinges on people’s expectation 
that the materially worthless pieces of paper will be accepted by others in exchange for 
valuable goods and their confidence in the monetary system itself. Without trust, no 
functionally differentiated economy and no modern monetary system could exist. At 
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the same time, the collapse of trust is an ever present threat to the economy which must 
be “suspended.”
Once uncertainty with regard to the fulfillment of contractual obligations and mon-
etary stability is acknowledged, trust can be recognized as a key example of the role of 
fictionality in economic action. The incalculability of the decision of the trust-taker 
– will he honor the trust or will he defect? – leads to a profound sense of insecurity on 
the side of the trust-giver (Goffman 1969: 69). If this situation is not to lead to paralysis, 
in which every advantage of cooperative action is lost in advance, then the “judgment” 
(Karpik 2010: 36) must prevail on the side of the trust-giver that the trust-taker will 
fulfill his contractual obligations. The expectation that the trust conferred upon the 
trust-giver will be honored is the fiction making the cooperative relationship possible. 
William James summarized this attitude of the trust-giver as the “will to believe”: 
Wherever a desired result is achieved by the co-operation of many independent persons, its 
existence as a fact is a pure consequence of the precursive faith in one another of those imme-
diately concerned. A government, an army, a commercial system, a ship, a college, an athletic 
team, all exist on this condition, without which not only is nothing achieved, but nothing is 
even attempted. (James 2006: 22)
The imagination of the trustworthiness of the trust-taker works as a tranquilizer en-
abling the trust-giver to remain calm despite the ever present possibility of non-fulfill-
ment (Beckert 2005). 
Harald Wenzel (2001) has explored the mechanisms through which imaginaries of 
trusting behavior influence the definition of the situation and the behavior of the trust-
taker. Wenzel analyzes trust as a form of para-social interaction, in which, through the 
advance concession of the trust-giver, a successful game of trust is pretended, but is in 
fact produced only with the subsequent action of the trust-taker – that is, through the 
actual fulfillment of the contractual obligation. But it is the decision of the trust-giver – 
based on the pretension that his trust will be honored – that makes the cooperation 
possible. The move by the trust-giver, Wenzel argues, influences the interaction out-
come itself by exercising influence over the behavior of the trust-taker in the same sense 
a gambit does in chess: the move by one player provokes a specific counter-move. The 
same idea is expressed by William James: “There are, then, cases where a fact cannot 
come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming. And where faith in a fact can 
help create the fact” (James 2006: 25). It is in the attitude of an “as if” in which the con-
stitutive force of trust is anchored. The “suspension of uncertainty” (Möllering 2006) 
operative in decisions involving trust is the phenomenon Samuel Coleridge identified 
as the “willing suspension of disbelief.” 
The centrality of trust for the operation of modern capitalist economies becomes most 
obvious in the monetary system. The operation of money involves fictions in the sense 
of as-if assumptions. The first fiction in the operation of money as medium of exchange 
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is that actors actually value the, in themselves, “worthless” pieces of paper that they ac-
cept in return for giving up property rights in valuable goods. Although money is not 
valuable, actors act as if it were. For this to take place, actors must assume that they can 
change the worthless notes back into valuable goods. Hence they must have trust in 
monetary stability. The fiction consists in the belief that the value of money will not 
have deteriorated at the point in time when the holder wants to use it for the purchase 
of goods. Philip Mirowski has called this assumption a “working fiction of a monetary 
invariant” (Mirowski 1991: 581). The fiction is “working” as long as actors believe in 
monetary stability; it is a fiction because monetary stability depends on the commit-
ment of central banks to low inflation (Ingham 2004: 31) and on macroeconomic de-
velopment in the future (Ganßmann 2010: 14 f.), both of which are uncertain. As the 
history of monetary crises shows, the devaluation of money is a recurrent phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, in a money economy actors must act as if the value of money were invari-
ant in order to accept the money as means of payment and abstain from inflationary 
wage and price increases in anticipation of a rise in prices. Because there can never be 
enough information the belief in the stability of money requires an element of “supra-
theoretical belief” or “social-psychological quasi-religious faith” (Simmel 2004[1978]: 
179, quoted from Ingham 2004: 65).
The stability of money and the monetary system depend on monetary policies but also 
on the actual fulfillment of the promises underlying credit relations. All emerging credit 
relationships necessarily involve trust in the ability of the debtor to repay his loan and 
in the issuer’s viability. The promise to repay, however, is confronted with uncertainty 
about whether the debtor will actually be able to repay the loan. If the debtor is a state 
the ability to repay the loan depends on tax revenues. If the debtor is a company its abil-
ity to repay the loan depends on the company’s success on the market and ultimately 
on macroeconomic developments. This must be assumed by the creditor but cannot be 
foreseen. Although the investor can ask private debtors for collateral or insure against 
loan default, financial crises show that such assurances easily become worthless, either 
because the collateral loses its value or because the insurer himself becomes insolvent. 
“If the expectations are not sufficiently fulfilled the whole system becomes destabilized” 
(Ganßmann 2010: 14). Monetary policy attempts to regulate the supply of credit in a 
way that trust in monetary stability is maintained but at the same time there is sufficient 
money supply in the economy to allow economic growth, which is itself a condition of 
monetary stability. 
Such a balance, however, is difficult to achieve, not only because of the unpredictability 
of future economic development but also because of the incentive structure of financial 
investors. Investors increase their profits through the extension of credit relations. Since 
the risks involved in credit relations are ultimately uncertain, their assessment is open 
to fictional expectations or can be biased through ignorance. This may lead to poor 
assessments of risks and hence to speculative bubbles that undermine the stability of 
the monetary system. The overevaluation of assets can lead to profitable investments 
as long as market opinion does not consider them unrealistic, in which case a run may 
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start (Minsky 1986 ). The fact that investors are overconfident is the outcome of fictions 
that provide rhetorical justification for participating in investments that later turn out 
to be speculative bubbles. Even if investors are aware of the overevaluation of an asset, 
the individual investor overestimates “the chances that he will be first in line when the 
borrower gets into difficulties and a run takes place” (Hellwig 1998: 718). 
4 The role of calculation and social macrostructures
So far, I have developed the concept of fictionality and applied the concept to several 
fields of economic decision-making. This has been done in juxtaposition to the con-
cepts of calculation and social macrostructures as the two devices identified in econom-
ics and sociology as forming the basis for decisions. To introduce the concept of fiction-
al expectations, however, does not mean that calculation and social macrostructures 
do not play a role in decision-making processes. How exactly does fictionality relate to 
calculation and social macrostructures? 
Calculation and fictionality
Approaches stressing the role of imaginaries in economic decision-making empha-
size that actors attempt to make decisions which maximize their utility and therefore 
must combine imagination with reason (Bronk 2009; Buchanan/Vanberg 2008[1984]; 
Shackle 1961). Hence it would be a grave misunderstanding to see the introduction of 
the concept of fictionality as promoting a theory of naïveté. Creative moments solidify 
into an action-guiding vision of a possible future … only if we judge them rationally as likely to 
be feasible and pertinent in the light of experience. Imagined futures and creative solutions of-
ten go way beyond what can be rationally deduced from today’s facts and hypotheses; but these 
potential futures and creative solutions must be stress-tested (so far as possible) by a rational 
and ethical audit, if they are not to lead us unnecessarily astray. (Bronk 2009: 206)
George Shackle underlined that “imagination must be constrained to be congru-
ous with what the decision-maker knows of things in general and of human nature” 
(Shackle 1961: 11). 
This oscillation between unbound imaginaries and calculation can be seen, for instance, 
in relationships involving trust: actors attempt to obtain information on the coopera-
tion partner and interpret carefully the signals that are available regarding the person’s 
trustworthiness (Bacharach/Gambetta 2001; Beckert 2005). Ultimately, however, the 
freedom of the trust-taker to defect cannot be eliminated and the decision to trust 
resembles a “leap” not justified by calculation, but based on faith, anchored in the as-if 
portrayal of the behavior of the trust-taker that she will honor the trust. 
22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 10 / 8
Investors also engage in meticulous calculative practices to find out about the likely 
prospects of an investment. However, the impossibility of including genuine novelty in 
such a calculation and the complexity of the decision situation due to its self-referenti-
ality makes the representation of future development always a fictional expectation. The 
imaginary makes it possible to overcome the profound sense of insecurity. Calculation 
plays a role in this, not only by providing reasons for the revision of prevailing fictional 
depictions but also as a practice through which disbelief in fictional representations is 
reduced.15 To demonstrate by means of mathematical models that certain events will 
take place tranquilizes actors and thereby reinforces their beliefs, despite the incalcula-
bility of outcomes.
The relationship between fictionality and calculation differs between consumption 
goods and investments. In the case of investments, fictional depictions of future states 
motivate investors to make monetary commitments despite the uncertainty of the prof-
it generated by them. The goal of the investment, however, is to maximize profits, the 
imaginaries being only a means through which situations are judged. Investors will at-
tempt to find inferences for the soundness of the investment by trying to calculatively 
assess the factors bearing upon the success of the investment and react accordingly.16
For consumption goods, the relationship between imaginaries and calculation is differ-
ent. The value of consumption goods desired for their symbolic qualities depends on 
the creation and maintenance of narratives constituting the symbolic value. The sym-
bolic meaning itself is non-calculative; it is based on the belief in the symbolically as-
cribed qualities of the good. Calculative struggles emerge around the question of which 
goods actually possess the symbolic value. This can be a struggle between competing 
firms (Callon/Méadel/Rabeharisoa 2002) or a struggle between status groups in society 
(Simmel 2004[1978]). Fashion is a constant struggle about which style is “in” or “out.” 
In the art market the actors in the field struggle over the artistic value of an artist and 
thereby constitute and shift value. In all these cases, however, calculation is not a means 
of calculating the “true” value of these goods. Calculation rather refers to strategies of 
firms attempting to position their products in ways that maximize symbolic value to 
increase market price or market share.17 
15 See, for instance, Zbaracki (2004: 17) who shows, based on ethnographic work in a large indus-
trial firm, that price-setting practices rely on economic price theory. But rather than determin-
ing prices, the theory has influence because it is used to legitimate the position advocated by 
a group of managers in the negotiations. “Price theory may serve as a rational myth” used by 
actors to orient themselves in a complex situation. 
16 In financial markets, what is relevant in these calculative processes, however, is not the personal 
opinion of the investor, but rather her assessment of the market opinion (Orléan 2005). Certain 
fictional depictions of the future can remain the basis of intentionally rational decision-making, 
if the actor is convinced that market opinion believes in them, even if she, in her personal opin-
ion, is convinced of the opposite.
17 This can be seen from lottery tickets. Lottery tickets are an investment under risk where the 
players lose, statistically, about half of their money. Knowing this, demand for lottery tickets 
should drop to zero. If interpreted as a consumption good, the value of the lottery ticket con-
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Macrostructures and fictionality 
Social macrostructures – that is, institutions, networks, and cultural frameworks – are 
connected to the emergence and stability of fictional expectations:
1. Institutional structures and networks can reduce uncertainty in the action situation 
and thereby support specific fictions. The imagination that the trust conferred in a 
business partner will not be exploited is facilitated by social networks (Granovetter 
2005) and an effective legal system (Coleman 1990). Likewise, entrepreneurial ideas 
depend “to a significant degree on the institutional framework in which innovators 
operate; and the ability of new ideas to take root likewise depends on the institutio-
nal environment” (Bronk 2009: 299). The channeling of contingencies through rules 
and social networks does not imply a deterministic force on the part of these rules 
with regard to the imaginaries: the creativity of actors exercised in the imagining of 
future states of the world remains and actors must always reckon with opportunistic 
behavior. 
2. Cognitive frames shape the direction of imaginaries. One example of this is the pre-
valence of a social norm to trust (or to distrust) in specific situations which feeds the 
imaginaries of outcomes of situations involving trust and ultimately the decision to 
trust (Karpik 2010). Another example is cultural expectations of economic accom-
plishment. Innovation as a form of deviant behavior is also anchored in the norma-
tive structure of modern capitalist societies, which values inner-worldly transcen-
dence through industriousness and success-seeking by risk taking (Merton 1957), 
and thereby encourages deviant imaginaries and the associated actions. The cultural 
frame is a powerful ingredient in imaginaries of a life in which these cultural expec-
tations are fulfilled. The imaginaries take on concrete forms as depictions of a life 
in wealth. The experience of actors of being unable to achieve these imaginaries by 
socially sanctioned means does not necessarily lead to an adaptation of the imagina-
ries. Merton analyses as the source of superstitious beliefs and of deviant behavior a 
conflicting situation in which the “incentives for success are provided by the estab-
lished values of the culture and second, the avenues available for moving toward this 
goal are largely limited by the class structure” (Merton 1957: 145). 
Hence, including fictional representations in a theory of economic decision-making 
does not deny the relevance of social structures. Seen from the perspective of the actor 
these macrostructures are typifications which guide imaginaries in culturally and insti-
tutionally rooted ways. 
sists of the daydreams it makes possible for the players. No rational calculation of the odds 
will deter the gambler from playing. Demand would decline if the tickets no longer generated 
daydreams. These correlations can be shown empirically (Beckert/Lutter 2009).
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5 Conclusion
This paper set out from the proposition that decision-making in the economy cannot be 
understood as the result of rational calculation of the factors relevant for the outcome. 
Fundamental uncertainty due to “unknown and unknowable” future events (Dequech 
2003) prevents such calculations. This implies that the expectations that intentionally 
rational actors hold are not of the kind assumed by rational expectations theory. The 
proposition developed in the paper states instead that expectations are fictional in the 
sense that they are based on pretensions of future states of the world. Decisions are built 
upon “fictional expectations.” 
Understanding decision processes based on the concept of fictionality points to a non-
teleological theory of action which brings the creativity of actors and the contingency 
of the future into the foreground (Joas 1996). The goal is not to develop a more accu-
rate theory of prediction but rather a theory of the unpredictability of the world and 
of how intentionality unfolds despite this unpredictability of outcomes. The “fiction-
ability” (Iser 1993) of humans allows for the imaginative representation of future states 
of the world in the mind and the imagination of decisions of other actors. The fictional 
representations of future states shape expectations and provide justifications for deci-
sions, reducing the ever possible disorientation of decision-makers due to the openness 
of the future. The concept of fictionality suggests an alternative not only to calculation-
based models in economics but also to the focus on social macrostructures prevailing 
in sociological approaches to the economy. 
The fiction-ability of humans is a source of innovation and novelty. Humans can imag-
ine a world different from the existing one, and “inhabit” this world through mental 
representations. Imaginaries can include depictions of genuine novelty. They can tran-
scend the known and thereby motivate decisions which create newness. Humans’ ability 
to imagine things that never were can contribute to actual future states by motivating 
actions. The future state fictionally claimed at the outset might be realized based on cor-
responding decisions. To include fictionality in a theory of decision-making provides 
a tool for understanding the dynamics of economic systems from a micro perspective. 
Fictional expectations, however, are not teleological in the sense that actors fix a future 
state in their mind and all steps to be taken derive from this representation of a goal. 
Instead, imaginaries and courses of action emerge in a reciprocal process in which goals 
and means inform each other, based on experiences of the situation and their interpre-
tation (Dewey 1998[1938]; Holmes 2009), as well as the power structures in the field 
(Hellwig 1999, 2009). Calculation enters this dialogical process continuously when ac-
tors attempt to find “proof” for the soundness of the imaginaries constituting their de-
cisions. Social macrostructures enter the process by shaping the imaginaries themselves 
through cognitive frames and by supporting actors in realizing specific imaginaries. In 
this sense, imaginaries are socially anchored and not purely individual. 
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If action is not determined by rational calculation or social structures, but also based 
on contingent imaginaries of future states it follows also that the imaginaries become 
contested. Although fictional representations do not anticipate actual future states they 
influence decisions in the present. These decisions have distributional consequences in 
the market, consequences for macroeconomic development and consequences for the 
institutionalization of regulatory rules. For example, the fictional expectations produced 
with regard to the technologies that will be used for the production of semiconductors 
(Möllering 2010) or the identification of approaches seen as promising for innovative 
cancer treatments (Mützel 2010) are part of a competitive struggle between firms, deter-
mining investments and equity prices. Financial markets are especially obvious targets 
for the strategic spread of fictional expectations – if other investors can be convinced of 
the future state these fictions depict, they are a source of profit opportunities.
The management of expectations of actors in the economy through fictions is not just 
relevant to understanding the intentionality of action but also for macroeconomic 
development. In the aggregate, expectations shape the development of economic pro-
cesses. “The great over-all processes of economic life – inflation, deflation, depression, 
recovery, and economic development are governed largely by the process of reorganiza-
tion of economic images through the transmission of messages” (Boulding 1956: 90). 
Making fictionality an essential element of a theory of intentionally rational decision-
making provides a vantage point for the understanding of the micro-foundations of the 
dynamics of capitalism. 
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